Key Points:
- The High Court held that an amendment under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, sought after commencement of trial to introduce a bank account that was within the plaintiff’s knowledge from the beginning, cannot be allowed merely by calling the omission a “typographical error”; due diligence under the proviso remains mandatory.
- At the same time, the Court held that closure of evidence is a serious consequence and, in the peculiar facts, restored one final opportunity to the plaintiff to conclude evidence, subject to ₹25,000 costs and strict conditions.
Full Judgment;
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
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I) CR-8356-2025 Krishna Kishore Neravati Alka Kumar II) CR-1387-2026 Krishna Kishore Neravati Alka Kumar
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...Petitioner ...Respondent ...Petitioner ...Respondent |
Reserved on 10.09.2026
Pronounced on: 14.09.2026
Pronounced fully/operative part: Fully
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA
Argued by:
Mr. Tanmoy Gupta, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Ashok Jindal, Advocate and
Mr. Nischay Jindal, Advocate for the respondent.
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DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
These two revision petitions arise out of the same civil suit instituted by the petitioner-plaintiff before the learned Additional District Judge-cum-Presiding Judge, Exclusive Commercial Court, Gurugram, and are, therefore, being decided by this common order.
2. In CR-8356-2025, the petitioner assails order dated 04.11.2025 (Annexure P-6),whereby his application under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'the CPC') seeking amendment of the plaint has been dismissed. In CR-1387-2026, the petitioner challenges the subsequent order dated 08.01.2026 (Annexure P-7), whereby his evidence was closed by order of the Court.
CR-8356-2025
3.1 The petitioner has instituted the suit seeking specific performance and possession of an alleged oral agreement in respect of the fourth floor and basement of the building situated at plot No. N-129, Mayfield Garden, Sector 51, Gurugram, along with parking, terrace rights and proportionate undivided share in the land underneath. An alternative relief for recovery of ₹1,61,88,070/- along with interest has also been claimed.
3.2 In paragraph 7 of the plaint, the petitioner pleaded the cost of construction allegedly incurred by him, while in paragraph 8 he disclosed the sources from which the expenditure was allegedly met. The original pleading referred to his HSBC account, his mother's SBI account and rental income from two properties.
4. During the course of the proceedings, the petitioner sought permission under Order VII Rule 14(3) CPC to tender, inter alia, the statement of his own SBI account bearing No. 37946323387. The said request was declined by the Ld. Commercial Court vide order dated 19.05.2025 (Annexure P-3), noticing that the plaintiff had neither referred to the said account in the plaint nor included the corresponding statement in the list of documents filed with the plaint. The Court further noticed that the account and the alleged use of funds therefrom were matters within the plaintiff's personal knowledge, possession and control.
5. Thereafter, the petitioner moved the application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment of paragraph 8 of the plaint by incorporating the particulars of the above said SBI account and pleading that construction expenditure had also been incurred through online transactions from that account during specified periods.
6. The learned Commercial Court dismissed the application vide impugned order dated 04.11.2025 (Annexure P-6), mainly on the ground that the petitioner had already entered the witness box as PW8; that the relevant bank account was within his knowledge from the inception; and that the amendment was being sought after the Court had declined permission to produce the corresponding bank statement. The Court concluded that the amendment amounted to filling a lacuna after evidence had been led.
7. Assailing the above order, Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon A.R. Ramaprasad v. Shoba Devi Law Finder Doc Id # 2885322; Jwaladutta Jankidas HUF v. Jayant Bhavanji Soni and another, 2021 (5) AIR Bombay R 300; and Societe Des Products Nestle S.A. and another v. Essar Industries, 2015 (70) RCR (Civil) 404, to contend that an amendment, which does not alter the fundamental nature of the suit and is necessary for determining the real controversy, should ordinarily be permitted.
8. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has supported the impugned order and relied upon Ravindra Kumar v. M/s L.S. Cable India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 Law Finder (P&H) 1254, and Jaswinder Kaur v. Dheeraj Sharma, 2026 Law Finder (P&H) 20300.
9. There can be no dispute with the broad proposition canvassed on behalf of the petitioner that the power of amendment under Order VI Rule 17 CPC is intended to advance the cause of justice and to enable the Court to determine the real controversy between the parties. Ordinarily, an amendment which is bona fide, does not introduce a wholly inconsistent case, does not cause irreversible prejudice to the opposite party and is necessary for effective adjudication, ought not to be refused on mere technicalities.
10. In Societe Des Produits Nestle S.A. (supra), the Delhi High Court reiterated that an amendment should normally be allowed unless it changes the nature of the suit or causes prejudice to the defendant. The amendment in that case concerned correction/enhancement of the valuation of the suit and was allowed, the Court noticing that the nature of the suit remained unchanged.
11. Similarly, in Jwaladutta Jankidas HUF (supra), the Bombay High Court, while dealing with a commercial summary suit, applied the principles summarised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy & Sons (2009) 10 SCC 84 and observed that the Court has to consider, whether the amendment is imperative for proper and effective adjudication, whether it is bona fide, whether it causes prejudice incapable of being compensated in money and whether refusal would result in injustice or multiplicity of proceedings. In that case, the amendment sought deletion of prayers, which were considered to be outside the scope of Order XXXVII CPC, and the amendment was allowed so as to bring the proceedings in conformity with the applicable procedural regime.
12. In A.R. Ramaprasad v. Shobha Devi(supra),the Karnataka High Court had declined an amendment sought at the stage of plaintiff's evidence on the ground of lack of due diligence. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and permitted the plaintiffs to amend the plaint by adding a prayer for recovery of possession, leaving the issue of limitation open to the defendant.
13. The aforesaid authorities, no doubt emphasise that the Court should adopt a justice-oriented approach while considering an application for amendment and should not refuse an amendment merely because the proceedings have progressed, or because the amendment may have some bearing upon the relief ultimately claimed. At the same time, none of these decisions lays down that the statutory proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC can be ignored, where the trial has commenced. The question whether the applicant has acted with due diligence necessarily depends upon the facts of each case.
14. In A.R. Ramaprasad (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court permitted the amendment in the peculiar facts of that case. The amendment sought there was for adding the relief of possession. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while allowing the amendment, expressly safeguarded the defendant's rights in relation to limitation. The said decision, therefore, cannot be read as laying down a proposition that whenever an amendment is necessary for complete adjudication, the requirement of due diligence contained in the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC becomes irrelevant. The Court itself proceeded on the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case.
15. The distinction is important in the present case. Here, the proposed amendment is not occasioned by any subsequent event, subsequent discovery of a fact, change in circumstances or any fact, which came to the knowledge of the petitioner after institution of the suit. The fact which the petitioner now seeks to incorporate relates to his own SBI bank account, from which he claims to have made payments towards construction. The said account was necessarily within his own knowledge when the plaint was instituted.
16. More importantly, the original plaint already contained a specific pleading regarding the sources from which the plaintiff claimed to have incurred the construction expenditure. In paragraph 8, the plaintiff referred to the funds withdrawn from his HSBC account, his mother's SBI account and rental income received from his properties. Thus, the source of funds was not an aspect, which had escaped the pleadings altogether. The petitioner consciously pleaded certain sources but did not plead the SBI account now sought to be introduced.
17. Still further, the petitioner had sought permission under Order VII Rule 14(3) CPC to tender the statement of his SBI account bearing No. 37946323387. The Commercial Court declined that part of the request specifically noticing that the account had neither been referred to in the plaint nor included in the list of documents filed with the plaint. The Court further noticed that the particulars of the account and the use of funds therefrom were within the personal knowledge, possession and control of the petitioner.
18. It is thereafter that the present amendment was sought. The petitioner proposed to introduce into paragraph 8 of the plaint the very factual basis which, according to the earlier order, was absent for permitting the SBI statement to be brought on record. The proposed amendment specifically refers to online transactions from the SBI account and the periods during which such transactions allegedly took place, besides seeking to rely upon the bank statements and related documents.
19. The above chronology cannot be ignored. The petitioner was aware of the SBI account from the inception; the account was not a subsequent acquisition or discovery; the petitioner did not plead it in the plaint; the corresponding bank statement was not disclosed with the original documents; permission to introduce the statement was thereafter declined for want of foundational pleading; and only subsequently, after the plaintiff had entered the witness box, the amendment application was moved.
20. The present case, is also materially different from Societe Des Produits Nestle’s case (supra). There, the amendment related to valuation of the suit and was necessitated in the context of the statutory requirement of specified value for commercial disputes. It did not seek to introduce a previously unpleaded factual foundation concerning the source of the plaintiff's case, or to supply the foundation for a document, which had already been withheld from evidence for want of pleading.
21. Likewise, Jwaladutta Jankidas HUF (supra) does not assist the petitioner on the question of due diligence. The amendment there was sought to delete prayers, which were found to be beyond the scope of Order XXXVII CPC, thereby bringing the suit in conformity with the procedural requirements applicable to a commercial summary suit. The Court found that refusal of the amendment would itself result in procedural complications and possible multiplicity of proceedings. The factual situation is materially different from the present case, where the amendment is sought to introduce a factual matter, which was admittedly within the plaintiff's knowledge from the inception.
22. A.R. Ramaprasad (supra) also does not compel a different conclusion. It is true that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the peculiar circumstances of that case, permitted addition of the prayer for possession notwithstanding the earlier rejection by the trial Court and High Court. However, the relief sought there was intrinsically connected with the subject matter of the existing suit and the Court expressly protected the defendant's rights on limitation. The decision does not hold that the statutory requirement of due diligence is to be ignored in every case where an amendment is necessary for adjudication.
23. On the other hand, the judgment relied upon by the respondent in Jaswinder Kaur v. Dheeraj Sharma (supra), decided by this Court on 21.04.2026, is considerably closer to the facts of the present case. There, the plaintiff had pleaded that she was in possession, but during her crossexamination admitted that she was not in possession. Despite having knowledge of the contrary factual position, she sought amendment at a much later stage to alter the relief. This Court held that although amendments are ordinarily to be liberally allowed, the power is circumscribed by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC and that the absence of due diligence assumes significance, where the relevant facts were within the plaintiff's knowledge and the amendment was sought after commencement of trial. The revision was consequently dismissed.
24. The principle emerging from the aforesaid authorities is, therefore, not that there is a choice between a liberal approach and a strict approach. The Court has to apply both principles harmoniously. The general rule is that amendments necessary for determining the real controversy should ordinarily be allowed; but where the trial has commenced, the applicant must additionally satisfy the statutory test of due diligence. The nature of the amendment, the stage at which it is sought, the applicant's knowledge of the facts and the explanation for the earlier omission are all relevant.
25. Tested on that principle, the petitioner fails to satisfy the requirement of due diligence. No explanation has been furnished, which establishes why the SBI account could not have been pleaded when the suit was instituted. The assertion that its omission was a typographical or clerical error is not sufficient. A typographical error ordinarily relates to an incorrectly stated fact; the present case concerns complete omission of a source of funds and the corresponding bank account from the factual foundation of the plaint.
26. The submission that the amendment merely elaborates an existing plea also cannot be accepted in its present form. Although the original plaint does contain a general pleading regarding sources of construction expenditure, the SBI account now sought to be introduced is a distinct source of funds. The proposed amendment also introduces specific periods of transactions and seeks to support the plea through bank statements and related documents. It is thus not merely correction of an arithmetical or typographical error.
27. Equally, the Court is not proceeding on the premise that every amendment, which assists a party in filling an evidentiary gap must necessarily be refused. The expression "filling a lacuna" cannot substitute for the statutory test. The relevant consideration here is that the factual matter was within the plaintiff's knowledge, was omitted despite that knowledge, and the amendment was sought only after the Court had declined permission to introduce the corresponding document for want of a initial pleading. This sequence furnishes a strong circumstance against the plea of due diligence.
28. The fact that no fundamental change is proposed in the nature of the suit is also not decisive. The proviso to Order VI Rule 17 operates independently. Even an amendment which does not alter the nature of the suit may be refused after commencement of trial if the applicant fails to establish that, despite due diligence, the matter could not have been raised earlier.
29. The consideration of prejudice to the respondent also has to be understood in this context. The respondent cannot be expected to meet a new factual foundation introduced after the plaintiff has already entered the witness box, particularly when the plaintiff seeks to rely upon documentary material corresponding to that newly introduced plea. The prejudice is not merely monetary or procedural. It concerns the opportunity to contest the factual foundation and to conduct the defence with reference to the pleadings on which the trial commenced.
30. Learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon Ravindra Kumar v. M/s L.S. Cable India Pvt. Ltd. (Supra). The said decision reinforces the need to examine the requirement of due diligence, where an amendment is sought after commencement of trial and the limited scope of revisional interference with the discretionary order of the trial Court. The said principle is attracted to the present case, where the Commercial Court has considered the relevant procedural history and has exercised its discretion on legally relevant considerations.
31. Consequently, while the Court fully acknowledges the liberal principles governing amendment of pleadings and the ratio of the authorities relied upon by the petitioner, those principles do not warrant any interference in the peculiar factual circumstances of the present case.
32. No jurisdictional error, perversity or material irregularity is, therefore, made out in the impugned order dated 04.11.2025 warranting interference by this Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
33. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed.
34. It is clarified that the observations made herein are confined to the prayer for amendment under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. Nothing contained in this order shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the plaintiff's substantive claim, including the alleged oral agreement, the expenditure allegedly incurred towards construction or the evidentiary value of any document otherwise admissible in accordance with law.
CR-1387-2026
35. The second revision arises from order dated 08.01.2026, whereby the learned Commercial Court closed the evidence of the plaintiff.
36. The order dated 08.01.2026 itself reveals that the matter had been fixed for payment of the previous cost of ₹1,000/- to PW9 Ratnakar Thakur and for rectifying a procedural lapse in recording his testimony through the Court Commissioner by re-examining him. On that date PW9 appeared and his examination-in-chief was recorded afresh. The proxy counsel appearing for the defendant expressly stated that he did not wish to further cross-examine the witness and that the cross-examination already recorded on 07.01.2026 be read as his cross-examination. The order further records that the remaining cost would be paid on the next date because the main counsel was unavailable.
37. Thereafter, the learned Commercial Court observed that it was the last opportunity for the plaintiff to conclude his evidence and that learned counsel for the plaintiff was unable to explain which additional witness or evidence was to be produced. The evidence of the plaintiff was consequently closed by order of the Court. The matter was then adjourned for the defendant's evidence.
38. The power of the trial Court to regulate its proceedings and to prevent unnecessary adjournments cannot be disputed. Particularly in commercial litigation, the Court is expected to ensure expeditious progress of the proceedings. A party cannot claim an unrestricted right to repeatedly seek adjournments or indefinitely prolong its evidence.
39. At the same time, closure of evidence is a serious procedural consequence. The ultimate object of procedure remains adjudication of the dispute on merits, and an opportunity to lead evidence should not ordinarily be shut out unless the conduct of the party demonstrates sufficient justification for such a drastic consequence or the Court has exhausted reasonable measures for ensuring compliance with its directions.
40. The facts recorded in the impugned order do not disclose that the petitioner was seeking to introduce a fresh line of evidence on that particular date after having deliberately defaulted on several previous opportunities. On the contrary, the immediate purpose for which the matter had been listed was itself connected with rectification of a procedural lapse in recording the evidence of PW9. PW9 did appear and his examination-in-chief was recorded afresh. The defendant also expressly waived further cross-examination and agreed that the earlier cross-examination be read as the cross-examination of the witness.
41. In these circumstances, the fact that the plaintiff's counsel could not, on that particular date, identify any further witness or evidence cannot, by itself, be treated as sufficient justification for completely foreclosing the plaintiff's evidence, unless the record demonstrates that adequate and meaningful opportunities had earlier been granted and deliberately wasted.
42. There is a distinction between refusing an unnecessary adjournment and permanently closing a party's evidence. The former is an ordinary case-management measure; the latter may substantially affect the party's ability to establish its case. The Court has to balance the requirement of expedition with the equally important requirement of a fair opportunity to present one's case.
43. The subsequent closure of evidence also has to be considered in the context of the fact that the plaintiff's application for amendment had already been rejected. The dismissal of that application does not, however, mean that the plaintiff should be deprived of an opportunity to conclude the evidence which he was otherwise entitled to lead on the pleadings as they stand. The two questions are distinct. The plaintiff's inability to satisfy Order VI Rule 17 CPC cannot automatically justify shutting out his evidence on the existing pleadings.
44. It is also relevant that the order dated 08.01.2026 does not record any specific finding that the plaintiff had refused to comply with a particular final direction, had failed to produce a named witness despite summons or process having been issued, or was deliberately attempting to delay the trial. What is recorded is that it was the last opportunity and that counsel could not explain which additional witness or evidence was to be produced.
45. In the opinion of this Court, in the peculiar circumstances noticed above, the ends of justice would be met by granting the petitioner one final opportunity to conclude his evidence, subject to payment of appropriate costs and subject to a strict condition that no further adjournment shall ordinarily be sought.
46. Such indulgence should not, however, be understood as permitting the petitioner to circumvent the order dated 04.11.2025 or to introduce evidence in support of the facts, which he was not permitted to incorporate by way of amendment. The evidence to be led shall remain confined to the pleadings, which presently constitute the basis of the suit and to documents/evidence otherwise admissible in accordance with law.
47. Consequently, the order dated 08.01.2026, insofar as it closes the plaintiff's evidence, is set aside. The petitioner is granted one final opportunity to conclude his evidence before the learned Commercial Court, subject to payment of costs of ₹25,000/- to the respondent on the date fixed by the learned Commercial Court.
48. The learned Commercial Court shall fix a proximate date for the petitioner to conclude his evidence. No further opportunity shall be granted to the petitioner and, in case of default, the order closing the evidence shall revive without the necessity of any further order from this Court.
49. It is clarified that this order shall not reopen the issue of amendment of the plaint decided vide order dated 04.11.2025. The dismissal of CR-8356-2025 is final so far as the amendment sought under Order VI Rule 17 CPC is concerned.
50. CR-1387-2026 is accordingly allowed in the aforesaid limited terms.
51. Both revision petitions stand disposed of in the above terms. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. A photocopy of this order be placed on the file of connected case.
14.09.2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA)
Yogesh JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
Uploaded on: 14.09.2026
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